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Land Fragmentation and its Implications for Productivity 
 
I.  Introduction 
In developing economies land reform, in particular land redistribution has occupied a central 
role in debates about poverty — particularly chronic poverty — alleviation in rural areas. 
Even if it were accepted that land redistribution could alleviate poverty the enthusiasm for 
such redistribution needs to be tempered with consideration of the potential efficiency effects 
of land fragmentation. The fragmentation of land holdings could rise with land fragmentation. 
In turn, land fragmentation could lead to sub-optimal usage of factor inputs and thus to lower 
overall returns to land. The factors contributing to this could be losses due to extra travel 
time, wasted space along borders, inadequate monitoring, and the inability to use certain 
types of machinery such as harvesters. 
Fragmentation of land is widespread in India and it is believed that fragmented nature 
of land holdings may play a major role in explaining low levels of agricultural productivity. 
Despite substantial rise in yields India ranks 34th in yields for sugarcane, 57th for cotton, 118th 
for pulses, and, 51st for rice although India is a leading producer of each of these crops in 
aggregate terms.1 Further, there is evidence of inefficient use of resources in agriculture and 
the resulting increases in costs, e.g., 25 times more water/tonne of output is being used to 
irrigate Cotton in India than in Egypt.  
In response to the perceived adverse effects of land fragmentation the then Finance 
Minister allocated Rs. 5 million over a period of five years, as an incentive for land 
consolidation, in his 2000 budget speech. However, the Planning Commission of India has 
indicated a near complete failure on this front. 
To date, however, there has been no systematic attempt at quantifying the effects of 
land fragmentation and understanding the channels through which these effects operate. The 
present paper attempts to fill this void.  
In this paper, we undertake a detailed assessment of the consequences of land 
fragmentation using a unique panel data set from Southern India, with comprehensive 
information on all landholding households in two contiguous villages over a five-year  
period. In particular, we examine whether technical efficiency of farm production is 
significantly related to farm size, whether yield is importantly impacted by the degree of 
fragmentation as measured by the number of plots, average plot size, and an index of 
                                                          
1 Economic Survey 1998–99. 
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 fragmentation,2 and whether such fragmentation impacts upon labor allocations. We then use 
stochastic production function methods to measure the degree of technical efficiency and 
relate this to the degree of land fragmentation. Our results show clearly that land 
fragmentation has a significant adverse effect on land productivity. 
 The plan of this paper is a follows. In section II we review the literature on this issue 
whereas section III discusses the data asset. Section IV details the methodology and 
estimation procedure, section V presents the results and section VI concludes. 
II.  A Brief Literature Review  
An important consideration in an evaluation of the consequences of land fragmentation for 
technical yields is whether economic processes that reflect local agro-climatic conditions 
drive such fragmentation. However, a more immediate reason for the overall patterns of land 
fragmentation in rural Indian the prevalence of the Zamindari system in many of the river 
valleys. The Zamindari system was characterized by highly inequitable pattern of land 
holdings with very few landowners holding onto most of the cultivatable land. To correct this 
inequitable pattern of land holding, the Indian Constitution (enacted in 1949), granted powers 
to different states to enact land redistribution measures. These efforts were supplemented in 
the early 1970s by the enactment of Land Ceiling Acts, which placed upper limits on land 
holdings and required the surplus land to be redistributed among the landless. This process 
along with the fragmentation through acts of succession from one generation to the next has 
reduced size of land holdings and led to fragmentation of land holdings of farmers. As noted 
earlier various laws designed to address the issue of fragmentation have met with only limited 
success.3
                                                          
2  The Januszewski index is defined as,  ∑
∑=
a
a
K   
where ‘a’ represents the parcel size. The index ranges between 0 and 1. 1 implies that the farmer holds all his 
land in the form of single plot. It has three properties: fragmentation increases (the value of the index 
decreases) as the number of plots increases, fragmentation increases when the range of plot sizes is small, and 
fragmentation decreases when the area of large plots increases and that of small plots decreases. Specifically, 
Januszewski’s index measures the number of plots and the size distribution of the plots.  
3  The Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation Act 1947, provides for State intervention for 
consolidation of fragments irrespective of the willingness of the people. This act also provides various 
incentives for co-operation such as wavering of consolidation fee charged by the government and granting of 
Taccavi loans to agriculturists whose lands have been consolidated. The East Punjab Holdings Act 1948, 
empowered the Punjab Government to take up consolidation in any area either on the request of the holders of 
an area or, on its own initiative. The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act 
1956, prohibits the creation of future fragments, a certain minimum area necessary for profitable cultivation to 
be defined as a standard minimum area and all holdings below that size to be treated as fragments.  
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 The literature on land size and land productivity is large and has been around for 
decades. In recent times Binswanger et. al. (1995) have argued that there is an inverse 
relation between the tow whereas Banerjee and Ghatak (1996) have questioned this result. 
Carlyle (1983), Heston and Kumar (1983), Bentley (1987), Blarel et al. (1992), Jabarin and 
Epplin (1994)) have focused on the impact of fragmentation on yield and productivity. The 
debate has focused basically on the impact of fragmentation on the ability of farmers to 
minimize risk since fragmentation was perceived to have a negative impact on productivity 
and yield.  
The impact of land size on technical efficiency has been investigated in a series of 
papers. The countries where this relationship has been studied include the Philippines (Herdt 
and Mandac 1981; Kalirajan and Flinn 1983; Dawson and Linagard 1989), Brazil (Taylor and 
Shonkwiler 1986), Tanzania (Shapiro 1983), Pakistan (Ali and Chaudhry 1989) and India 
(Huang and Bagi 1984; Kalirajan 1981; Junankar 1980; Sidhu 1974; Lau and Yotopoulos 
1971; Battese, Coelli and Colby 1989; Tadesse and Krishnamoorthy 1997; Kumbhakar and 
Bhattacharya 1992; and, Jha and Rhodes 1999).4 These studies make use of stochastic 
production function methods and conclude that the large variation in yield across farmers is 
due to differences in technical efficiency, which is largely influenced by farm size, size of the 
land holding, ecological factors and their interaction with factor inputs like land, technology 
and fertilizer. However, to the best of our knowledge there does not exist any study linking 
technical efficiency to land fragmentation.  Part of the reason for this is the lack of reliable 
data on land fragmentation. We address this issue by studying a unique primary data set 
where information on such fragmentation and its evolution are collected.  
 
III. The Data 
The deltas at the ends of the river valley systems in India have traditionally been major 
centers of agricultural production, with farmers adopting innovative methods of cultivation in 
response to changing conditions and new technologies. In recent years, these regions have 
been increasingly prone to water stress arising from either, a) depletion of ground water 
resources through over-exploitation, and, b) river water disputes. The Kaveri Delta in Tamil 
Nadu has been historically considered as a ‘rice bowl’ of southern India. This is the region in 
which scientific methods of irrigation were developed as far back as the Chola period in the 
8th century AD. One of these villages, in this region (Nelpathur) is also the place in which the 
                                                          
4  For a good review, see Sankar (1997) and Battese and Coelli (1992) 
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 ‘grow more food’ program — a precursor of the Green Revolution — in the late 1960s was 
launched. This region is, however, currently seeing a general decline in rice production and 
farmers are resorting to crop diversification.  
The data for this study were collected over a 5-year period beginning 1995 in 2 
contiguous villages (Nelpathur and Thirunagari) situated in the Sirkhazi taluk of the 
Thanjavur district of Tamil Nadu, India. These villages are located in the Kaveri Delta. 
Thirunagari is a larger village as compared to Nelpathur. According to the 1991 Census the 
number of households in Nelpathur is 550 whereas it is 881 in Thirunagari. The population in 
Nelpathur is 2237 whereas in Thirunagari it is 3700. The number of children below the age of 
6 is 306 in Nelpathur whereas in Thirunagari it is 410. Around 19% of the Thirunagari village 
population is engaged in farming (165 households). Nelpathur has a greater proportion (28%) 
of the population engaged in agricultural activities. There are 1250 acres of cultivable land in 
Nelpathur and 2000 acres in Thirunagari. The number of agricultural workers is 1500 in 
Thirunagari and 1200 in Nelpathur. There is no noticeable forest cover in any of these 
villages. In Thirunagari, government canals irrigate 1100 acres of cultivable land while such 
canals in Nelpathur irrigate 700 acres. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The survey data were collected for 137 farmers of the Nelpathur village and 83 farmers of 
Thirunagari, for the period 1995–1999. Farmers were asked questions regarding their land 
holdings, crops grown, output produced, inputs used and ownership of factors of production. 
Data was also collected on the price paid by the farmers for the factor inputs used and the 
price they receive for their output (both from the traders and the government). Information 
was obtained for the number of plots owned by the farmers, the size of each of these plots 
and the crops grown in these plots. Questions regarding the outputs of different crops grown 
by the farmers and the revenue obtained from these crops were also a part of the 
questionnaire. Farm input data is in terms of the quantity and the total cost spent on seeds, 
fertilizers, irrigation, bullocks, cartage, manure and machinery, general labor, labor for land 
preparation, and labor for harvesting and threshing. Tables 1 to 2 and Figures 2 to 7 describe 
the data.  
 
Tables 1 to 2 and Figures 2 to 7 here 
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 IV. Methodology 
The basis for our empirical investigations is the estimation of a generalized translog cost 
function (Christensen and Green 1976) of the form: 
( )
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where γij = γji, Cit is total cost of production of i-th farmer in t-th year, Yit is output, and the 
Pit’s are the prices of the factor inputs and, Xit is the variable with respect to which scale 
economies have to be tested. Xit can be farm-size, number of plots cultivated or the average 
plot-size (only one Xit variable is used at any one time). In order to correspond to a well-
behaved production function, a cost function must be homogeneous of degree one in prices, 
i.e., for a fixed level of output; the total cost must increase in proportion to the increases in 
prices. This implies the following relationship among the parameters, 
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In the presence of constant returns to scale, θ =1. Scale economies are indicated by a 
coefficient of less than one and scale diseconomies by a coefficient that is grater than one. 
Analogously the effects of fragmentation and landsize on yields may be estimated using a 
translog production function, 
∑∑∑ ++=
i j
jtitij
i
itiit xxxy lnln2
1lnln 0 ββα    (2) 
where βij  = βji , and xit’s are per acre input factors and yit is the output per acre. 
 Production function estimation may also be used to test for possible heterogeneity in 
the productivity of labor input. In particular, consider 
( )it
i j
jtitij
i
itiit pXXXY lnlnln2
1lnln 0 θββα +++= ∑∑∑     (3) 
where βij  = βji , and Y is the logarithm of the outputs of Samba, Black Gram and Cotton, Xi’s 
are the inputs namely various kinds of labor inputs, acreage, fertilizer, pesticide, bullocks, 
machinery and irrigation (number of hours), and, pit is defined below, depending on the 
nature of heterogeneity being tested:  
a) For intra-activity labor heterogeneity: 
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         pit = hired labor/(hired labor + family labor)  
tivity A + Hired 
In case of intra-activity labor heterogeneity, a negative and significant θ indicates that hired 
b) For inter-activity labor heterogeneity : 
pit = hired labor in activity A/(hired labor in ac
        labor in activity B). 
labor is inefficient as compared to family-provided labor. A positive and significant but 
below unity value suggests that hired labor is more efficient, but the difference in marginal 
productivity of these two types of labor declines as hired labor increases in importance in the 
labor force. A positive but greater than unity value of θ indicates that hired labor is more 
efficient and the difference in marginal productivity of these two types of labor increases as 
hired labor increases in importance in the labor force. An insignificant value of θ suggests 
that there is no difference between the marginal productivity of the two kinds of labor. To 
address whether supervision decreases labor heterogeneity one may also condition production 
on levels of supervision in different activities.  
( ) bitaitit
i j
jtitij
i
itiit SSpXXXY +++++= ∑∑∑ lnlnln21 ββα lnln 0 θ    (4) 
where, Sait and Sbit represent the supervision hours devoted to activity A and B respectively. 
. 
Consid
Examination of technical efficiency is carried out using a translog functional form
er the stochastic frontier production function5 for panel data,  
itititit UVtXfY −+= ),,( β         (5) 
where Yit is the output (or the loga  of the output) of the i-th farmer in the t-th timrithm e 
period; Xit is a (k×1) vector of (transformations of the) input quantities of the i-th farmer in 
the t-th time period; f(.) is a suitable functional form of the production function, β is a (1×k) 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; t is a time trend representing technical 
change; Vi’s are random errors which are assumed to i.i.d. N(0,
2
vσ ), and independent of the 
Ui’s; the Ui’s are non-negative random variables assumed  account for technical 
inefficiency in production and are assumed to be independently distributed, such that U
 to
i is 
obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean, δiz , and variance, 2uσ ;  
                                                          
5 See Battese, Coelli and Rao (1999). 
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 zi is a (m×1) vector of explanatory variables associated with technical inefficiency of 
production of farmers over time; and δ is an (1×m) vector of unknown coefficients.  
Equation (5) specifies the stochastic frontier production function in terms of the 
original production values. However, the technical inefficiency effects, the Ui’s are assumed 
to be a function of a set of explanatory variables, the zi’s, and an unknown vector of 
coefficients, δ. The explanatory variables in the inefficiency model may include some input 
variables in the stochastic frontier, provided the inefficiency effects are stochastic. If the first 
z-variable has value one and the coefficients of all other z-variables are zero, then this case 
represents the model specified in Stevenson (1980) and Battese and Coelli (1988, 1992). If all 
elements of the δ-vector are equal to zero, then the technical inefficiency effects are not 
related to the z-variables and so the half-normal distribution originally specified in Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) is obtained. If interactions between farm-specific variables and 
input variables are included as z-variables, then a non-neutral stochastic frontier, proposed in 
Huang and Liu (1994), is obtained. 
The technical inefficiency effect, Ui, in the stochastic frontier model (5) could be 
specified in equation (6), 
iii WzU += δ                         (6) 
where the random variable, Wi, is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with 
zero mean and variance, σ such that the point of truncation is 2u , δiz− , i,e., Wi ≥ δiz− . e 
assumptions are consistent with U
Thes
i being a non-negative truncation of the N( δiz , )-
distribution.  
2
uσ
Huang and Liu (1994) proposed an interesting generalization of the above 
specification. They permitted interaction effects between the variables in the stochastic 
production frontier, Xi, and the determinants of inefficiency, zi. Thus the frontier itself is 
subjected to non-neutral shifts. In this case the Ui in equation (6) are modified to read: 
iiiii WXzzU ++= ** δδ         (7) 
where  is a vector of values of appropriate interaction terms between the variables in  
z
ii Xz *
i and Xi  and δ* is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.  
The method of maximum likelihood is proposed for simultaneous estimation of the 
parameters of the stochastic frontier and the model for the technical inefficiency effects. The 
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 likelihood function and its partial derivatives with respect to the parameters of the model are 
presented in Battese and Coelli (1993). The likelihood function is expressed in terms of the 
variance parameters,  and . 222 uvs σσσ +≡ su 22 / σσγ ≡
The technical efficiency of production for the i-th firm is defined by (7), 
( ) ( iiii WzUTE )−−=−= δexpexp     (7) 
The prediction of the technical efficiencies is based on its conditional expectation, given the 
model assumptions.  
The reduced form representation of the translog production function is as follows, 
  
ititttt
j k
iktijtjk
j
ijttit
UVtt
XXXY
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2
0 lnln2
1ln)ln(
ββ
βββ
  (8)  
where the technical inefficiency effects are assumed to be defined by 
itttt
j
ijtjzoit WttzU ++++= ∑ 2)( δδδδ     (9) 
where the subscript i and t represent the i-th farmer and the t-th year of operation, Yit is (the 
logarithm of) the Tornqvist index of the outputs of Samba and Blackgram or Samba and 
Cotton;6 β’s and δ’s are the unknown parameters to be estimated; t = 1,… 5 is a time trend for 
the duration of the panel. Vit and Wit are as defined in the previous section; Xit are the 
independent variables, the inputs; zijt are the variables that are supposed to determine the 
inefficiency. Table 7 lists the Xi variables and zi variables used in the estimation. 
 
 
 Table 7 here 
 
We use both male-female wage gap and wage gap between farm labor and non-farm labor as 
determinants of inefficiency. The wage gap (between farm labor and non-farm labor) is 
                                                          
6  If Y  represents the outputs of crop k in period t produced by farmer i, and Wikt ikt  the value share for output of 
crop k in period t, then the Tornqvist index in its log-change form is given by, 
( iktikt
i
iktikt
st YY
WWY lnln
2
ln −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∑ )                                              
where s and t represent the time periods.  
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 defined as the difference between the wage paid to the hired agricultural worker and the wage 
received by the same agricultural worker during off-farm season in brick-kilns and prawn 
farms. This gap appeared around 1994–95 and has led to a rise in agricultural wages. In 
addition to this the viability of the second crop after Rice (especially Samba rice) is 
dependent on the availability of hired labor. The second crop usually is grown when the 
brick-kilns and the prawn farms are in operation. Hence the labor supply during the period 
when the second crop is grown is seriously truncated. This has consequences in the form of 
less than the optimal quantity of labor being available to the farmers growing the second 
crop. Therefore we believe that the wage gap will impact the technical efficiency of 
cultivation of the crop sequences. 
The inefficiency frontier model (8)-(9) accounts for both technical change and time-
varying inefficiency effects. The time variable in the stochastic frontier (8) accounts for 
Hicksian neutral technological change. However, the time variable in the inefficiency model 
(9) species that the inefficiency effects may change linearly with respect to time. The 
distributional assumptions on the inefficiency effects permit the effects of technical change 
and time-varying behavior of the inefficiency effects to be identified, in addition to the 
intercept parameters, βo, and δo, in the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model. Time 
outside the frontier is used as a factor that could create non-neutrality. This is in line with the 
logic that with the passage of time, the technology in use could influence the rate of 
substitution between factors of production. The fixed effects from the estimation of equation 
(4) for the different crops are used as determinants of inefficiency. These fixed effects 
explain the impact of fragmentation on technical efficiency. 
 
V. Estimation Procedure 
The general model of the stochastic frontier (4) along with the technical inefficiency effects 
(5) can be simultaneously estimated by maximum likelihood method with the null hypothesis 
for no technical inefficiency effects  0:0 =γH . The parameter γ lies between 0 and 1 and 
this range can be searched to provide a good starting value for use in the iterative 
maximization process such as Davidson-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) algorithm. We use the 
FRONTIER 4.1 of Coelli (1996) to estimate the models. If the null hypothesis is accepted 
this would mean that σu2 is zero and therefore would mean that the Ui’s should be removed 
from the model, leaving a specification with parameters that can be consistently estimated 
using ordinary least squares.  
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 VI. Results 
We turn to discussing the results of the estimation procedure used to examine the relationship 
between fragmentation and technical efficiency. We proceed to discuss the results 
progressively. 
i. There is a significant positive relationship between farm size, average plot size and 
yield. This test is conducted for two dominant crop sequences in these villages namely 
Samba-Blackgram and Samba-Cotton. However there is a negative relationship between 
number of plots cultivated and the yields of these crop-sequences. More importantly, the 
magnitude of this relationship differs as one goes from Samba-Blackgram to Samba-
Cotton.  
 
        Table 3a here 
 
From these results one can infer that fragmentation (as measured by number of plots) 
has a negative impact on yields and consequently is a problem to be addressed.  
 
ii. The test for no economies of scale with respect to number of plots cultivated is strongly 
rejected in the case of both Samba-Blackgram and Samba-Cotton. This then implies that 
it will be optimal for the farmers to have the land holdings in fewer plots. In fact it is 
interesting and revealing to note that complete fragmentation might not be a desired 
outcome for all the farmers in these villages. This is evident by the shape of the SRAC 
curve with respect to fragmentation. This then suggests that consolidation should result 
in farmers holding “optimal number of plots”. 
  
Figure 8 here 
 
However there are significant economies of scale with respect to both farm-size and 
plot-size. This result is interesting in the context of current distribution of land holdings 
in these villages that suggests a preponderance of small and marginal landholders. 
Hence farmers should be provided incentives to consolidate their land holdings. 
Farmers should also look into the possibility of increasing farm-size through leasing-in, 
purchases, co-operative farming etc. 
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Table 3b here 
 
 
iii. There is strong evidence to suggest that the family-provided labor is less efficient than 
the hired labor for different crops and for different activities for each crop. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
These results suggest that farmers can achieve the desired level of efficiency by hiring 
labor for different activities. The results also indicate that for Samba-Blackgram the 
current level of input-mix (hired and family-provided) is about close to optimal 
(indicated by low values of the coefficient). However for Samba-Cotton the hired labor 
intensities could be increased. 
 
iv. Given the preceding result there will be tendency on the part of the farmers to hire 
inputs. Hired inputs need not be homogeneous in terms of their respective efficiency. 
Input heterogeneity (especially labor heterogeneity) can lead to significant reduction in 
technical efficiency. Hence it is important for us to determine the magnitude of such 
heterogeneity. The results indeed show that there are significant levels of heterogeneity 
in performance of hired labor across different activities for different crops. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
It is believed that most of this labor heterogeneity is caused by land fragmentation. 
However this is a proposition that needs to be tested. Impact of land fragmentation 
needs to be empirically tested. Impact of land fragmentation on efficiency of specific 
factors of production is as such a phenomenon yet to be established. Farmers, who have 
hired factor inputs, engage in a level of supervision to ensure efficiency of these inputs. 
We are able to show that hired supervision is able to reduce labor heterogeneity 
significantly. These results are shown in tables. We posit here that any residual labor 
heterogeneity is caused by land fragmentation.  
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 a) The impact of fragmentation on labor heterogeneity is estimated after controlling for 
fixed effects for fragmentation on output. We are able to establish a clear causation 
between fragmentation and fixed effects for different crop sequences. We find that a 
significant number of these fixed effects are caused by fragmented landholdings. 
When equation (4) was estimated controlling for fragmentation we find both 
positive and negative fixed effects. This causality suggests that there could be 
returns to fragmentation for such farmers (reinforced by our finding on the shape of 
the average short run cost curve). Irrespective of the sign of the fixed effects we find 
a significant causality between fragmentation and fixed effects which suggests that 
the impact of fragmentation on technical efficiency is likely to be indirect rather 
than direct. 
 
Figures 9 here 
 
In order to fully capture the impact of these fixed effects on technical efficiency we 
choose to use these as factors determining inefficiency.  
 
vi. The estimates of the stochastic frontier are shown in Tables 6. The variables used for 
estimation are described in Table 7.  
 
Tables 6, and, 7 here 
 
The joint frontier is accepted in favor of independent frontier. We note that following 
significant results from the estimation process - 
a) Farm size has a positive impact on technical efficiency. 
b) The male-female wage-gap is a significant phenomenon in these villages. Such a 
wage-gap contributes significantly to technical inefficiency. However we note that 
this gap matters only for the crop sequence Samba-Cotton. 
c) In both these villages localized non-farm employment is on the rise. Brick-kiln and 
prawn-farms are popular sources of non-farm employment during specific seasons 
that overlaps the cultivation of second crop (Blackgram or Cotton). The wage-gap 
between farm and non-farm activity significantly tends to reduce technical 
efficiency. 
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 d) We test the impact of fragmentation on technical efficiency by using the fixed 
effects caused by fragmentation on different activities. These fixed effects on an 
average tend to produce significant negative impacts on technical efficiency. Hence 
we are not able to completely reject the hypothesis that fragmentation has a negative 
impact on technical efficiency. This is an added evidence to suggest that farmers on 
an average want to posses their holdings in optimal number of plots. 
 
VII. Conclusions  
This paper has shown that fragmentation has a significant impact on technical efficiency. The 
policies must be designed to allow for consolidation to take place. However one should 
understand that even if markets are allowed to function. Potential consolidation may not take 
place and farmers may choose to hold a specific number of plots. We in fact see such a 
phenomenon when the average variable cost is examined in relation to fragmentation. 
The impact of fragmentation as measured by fixed effects illustrates the fact that 
fragmentation has both negative and positive effects on technical efficiency. In fact we 
indeed find some of the positive effects of such fixed effects quite significantly large. Hence 
if consolidation has to occur through markets than a level of fragmentation is inevitable. 
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 Table 1 : Village wise summary of crops grown and main inputs used 
 
 
 Average Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum  Number of farmers 
 
Nelpathur 
      
Samba      
Acreage (acre)  3.15 5.44 0.28 48.04 137 
Output (Kg) 5740.62 9910.15 276 85800 137 
Yield (Kg/acre) 1359.50 387.37 360.87 2819.55 137 
Black Gram      
Acreage (acre)  2.96 5.37 0.28 48.29 124 
Output (Kg) 906.64 1547.37 80 13308 124 
Yield (Kg/acre) 261.46 67.76 72 451.12 124 
Cotton      
Acreage (acre)  2.64 1.55 0.66 6.60 18 
Output (Kg) 2695.11 1269.44 800 6000 18 
Yield (Kg/acre) 1184.8 190.8 900 1875 18 
Total inputs used      
Cartage (no. of trips) 11 16 2 125 113 
Hired labor (no. of labor days) 307 449 26 3906 137 
Family provided Labor (no. of labor days) 65 27 2 123 86 
Seed purchases (Kg) 164 346 2 1575 30 
Seed family provided (Kg) 179 276 16 2149 128 
Pesticide (Ltr) 272 1187 8 13241 135 
 
Thirunagari 
 
Samba      
Acreage (acre)  1.54 1.01 0.32 6.13 83 
Output (Kg) 2982.29 1792.68 900 10800 83 
Yield (Kg/acre) 1656.1 255.25 1194.69 2531.25 83 
Black Gram      
Acreage (acre)  1.52 0.95 0.32 6.13 80 
Output (Kg) 496.31 275.42 180 1800 80 
Yield (Kg/acre) 294.5 51.81 206.9 506.25 80 
Cotton      
Acreage (acre)  2.21 1.60 0.79 3.95 3 
Output (Kg) 2733.33 1921.80 1000 4800 3 
Yield (Kg/acre) 1248 28.5 1215.19 1265.8 3 
Total inputs used      
Cartage (no. of trips) 6 4 2 24 79 
Hired labor (no. of labor days) 164 110 46 655 83 
Family provided Labor (no. of labor days) 70 15 4 98 61 
Seed purchases (Kg) 30 47 3 100 4 
Seed family provided (Kg) 81 48 29 300 82 
Pesticide (Ltr) 68 70 14 462 83 
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 Table 2 : Profit margin and coefficient of variation*
 
 
 Small farmers Medium farmers Large farmers 
Year Avg profit CV Avg profit CV Avg profit CV 
    
Samba 
 
   
1995 0.1 23.61 -0.02  0.13 9.37 
1996 0.3 9.36 0.19 14.47 -0.09  
1997 0.68 4.76 0.24 16.81 0.69 1.5 
1998 0.86 3.38 0.72 4.05 0.94 0.73 
1999 1.03 2.75 0.46 10.03 1.39 0.55 
 
Black Gram 
 
1995 6.85 0.09 6.83 0.1 6.16 0.23 
1996 6.92 0.1 6.94 0.11 6.07 0.21 
1997 11.92 0.06 11.86 0.07 11.33 0.16 
1998 8.02 0.09 8.14 0.1 7.45 0.22 
1999 11.58 0.07 11.68 0.09 11.25 0.16 
 
Cotton 
 
1995 9.76 0.07 9.87 0.06 10.22 0.04 
1996 11.26 0.08 11.38 0.07 11.76 0.04 
1997 11.94 0.07 11.9 0.09 12.49 0.04 
1998 13.9 0.1 13.67 0.08 14.67 0.09 
1999 15.16 0.09 14.92 0.07 15.8 0.09 
 
Samba-Black Gram 
 
1995 6.93 0.38 6.71 0.46 6.42 0.31 
1996 7.21 0.42 7.06 0.44 6.01 0.36 
1997 12.6 0.27 11.85 0.41 12.14 0.18 
1998 8.96 0.35 8.8 0.37 8.41 0.24 
1999 12.75 0.23 11.86 0.45 12.62 0.17 
 
Samba-Cotton 
 
1995 9.06 0.24 10.34 0.13 10.03 0.07 
1996 10.97 0.22 12.1 0.13 12.03 0.07 
1997 11.68 0.25 12.89 0.15 13.3 0.06 
1998 13.22 0.21 15.32 0.14 15.15 0.06 
1999 15.18 0.22 16.51 0.14 16.62 0.04 
 
 
 
                                                          
* Small farmers : Farmers with less than 2 acres. 
   Medium farmers : Farmers with 2 to 4 acres. 
   Large farmers : Farmers with  4 or greater than 4 acres 
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 Table 3: 
 
3.a: Yield as a function of farm size, Number of plots cultivated and Average plot size 
 
 Farm size Number of plots cultivated Average plot size 
Samba-Blackgram 0.0344 -0.0244 0.0301 
 (0.002) (0.01) (0.001) 
Samba-cotton 0.2509 -0.2407 0.1518 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
3.b: Testing for Economies of scale w.r.t. Farm size, Number of plots and Average plot size 
 
 Farm size Number of plots cultivated Average plot size 
Samba-Blackgram 0.050 1.844 0.119 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Samba-cotton 0.049 2.912 0.047 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
 
 
Table 4: Test of heterogeneity  between hired and family labor7
 
       Samba 
Hired 
Land preparation 0.2843 
(0.029) 
Sowing 0.0257 
(0.560) 
Transplanting 0.2598 
(0.002) 
Fertilizer and Pesticide Application 0.3369 
(0.238) 
Harvesting 0.3316 
(0.000) 
 
Black Gram 
 
Sowing 0.0701 
(0.008) 
Harvesting 0.0304 
(0.837) 
 
Cotton 
 
Land preparation (earthing) 0.6983 
(0.165) 
Sowing 0.6583 
(0.010) 
Harvesting (picking) 0.0265 
(0.932) 
                                                          
7 No family labor was employed for weeding operations.  
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Table 5 : Test of heterogeneity between hired labor employed for various activities*
5.1.a   Samba: Pre supervision efficiency gap 
 land preparation Sowing transplanting irrigation weeding   fertilizer/pesticide application harvesting
Land preparation 0       
        
     Sowing 0.1568 0   
 (0.103)      
      
 
Transplanting 0.0678 1.112 0  
 (0.193)       
       
(0.089)
Irrigation -0.1969 0.7831 -0.5746 0
 (0.028)       
       
(0.084) (0.012)
Weeding 0.2149 0.1172 0.9325 0.1247 0
 (0.037)       
       
(0.097) (0.001) (0.004)
Fertilizer/pesticide application 0.4616 0.1769 0.3796 0.5569 0.2129 0
 (0.129)       
       
        
(0.061) (0.054) (0.000) (0.069)
Harvesting -0.3272 1.6813 -0.4063 0.7504 0.8335 1.2678 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 
5.1.b  Samba: Post supervision efficiency gap 
 
 land preparation Sowing transplanting irrigation weeding   fertilizer/pesticide application harvesting
Land preparation 0       
        
     Sowing 0.1449 0   
 (0.131)      
      
 
Transplanting 0.054 0.954 0  
 (0.302)       
       
(0.137)
Irrigation -0.0154 0.313 -0.1023 0
 (0.073)       
       
(0.011) (0.110)
Weeding 0.1934 0.1139 0.7561 -0.0104 0
 (0.063)       
       
(0.101) (0.008) (0.835)
Fertilizer/pesticide application 0.4301 0.1683 0.2033 0.3744 0.1943 0
 (0.157)       
      
        
(0.067) (0.308) (0.020) (0.100)
Harvesting -0.319 1.5191 -0.3897 0.3721 0.8009 1.0636 0 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
                                                          
* The activities in the rows are in the numerator and the activities in the columns form the denominator. 
 
5.2.a  Black Gram: Pre supervision efficiency gap 
 
 sowing Harvesting 
   
Sowing 0  
   
Harvesting 0.02639 0 
 (0.073)  
 
5.2.b  Black Gram: Post supervision efficiency gap 
 
 sowing Harvesting 
   
Sowing 0  
   
Harvesting 0.02637 0 
 (0.074)  
 
5.3.a  Cotton: Pre supervision efficiency gap 
 
 Earthing sowing irrigation weeding fertilizer/pesticide application picking 
earthing 0      
       
sowing 2.0902 0     
 (0.087)      
irrigation 0.4089 0.5677 0    
 (0.264) (0.105)     
weeding -0.4904 0.6454 -0.6599 0   
 (0.260) (0.007) (0.000)    
fertilizer/pesticide application 0.3661 0.9317 -0.5044 -0.5617 0  
 (0.138) (0.005) (0.092) (0.049)   
picking 0.4102 0.8102 0.6135 0.3587 0.3109 0 
 (0.388) (0.080) (0.003) (0.020) (0.124)  
 
5.3.b  Cotton: Post supervision efficiency gap 
 
 Earthing sowing irrigation weeding fertilizer/pesticide application picking 
earthing 0      
       
sowing 1.1144 0     
 (0.465)      
irrigation 0.3418 0.4006 0    
 (0.406) (0.283)     
weeding -0.1912 -0.1227 -0.178 0   
 (0.648) (0.675) (0.352)    
fertilizer/pesticide application 0.0533 -0.1577 -0.2539 -0.1432 0  
 (0.890) (0.684) (0.416) (0.644)   
picking 0.177 -0.435 0.1851 -0.0918 -0.0289 0 
 (0.721) (0.629) (0.414) (0.623) (0.898)  
 
ASARC Working Paper 2005/01  21 
 Table 6.a : Stochastic Frontier Results for both villages :Samba-Blackgram 
 
 Coefficient t-ratio Variable 
beta 0 10.561 24.546 intercept 
beta 1 3.363 15.258 ln(acreage) 
beta 2 0.040 0.227 ln(harvesting-threshing labor) 
beta 3 -0.602 -4.097 ln(threshing-machine) 
beta 4 -0.138 -1.328 ln(general labor) 
beta 5 0.244 2.831 ln(nursery labor) 
beta 6 0.013 2.402 ln(bull) 
beta 7 -2.127 -16.348 ln(seeds) 
beta 8 -0.009 -0.190 ln(irrigation-hrs) 
beta 9 -0.019 -0.810 ln(potash) 
beta10 0.298 10.701 ln(acreage)^2 
beta11 0.105 6.306 ln(land-preparation-labor)^2 
beta12 0.004 0.940 ln(pesticide)^2 
beta13 0.040 4.374 ln(cartage)^2 
beta14 0.015 1.111 ln(general-labor)^2 
beta15 0.020 0.953 ln(nursery-labor)^2 
beta16 0.017 2.856 ln(seeds)^2 
beta17 -0.007 -0.876 ln(irrigation-hrs)^2 
beta18 0.007 0.888 ln(DAP)^2 
beta19 -0.003 -0.686 ln(urea)^2 
beta20 0.016 3.102 ln(potash)^2 
beta21 0.051 10.030 time 
beta22 -0.075 -1.733 ln(acreage)*ln(supervision-labor) 
beta23 -0.162 -5.599 ln(land-preparation-labor)*ln(supervision-labor) 
beta24 -0.238 -4.579 ln(harvesting-threshing-labor)*ln(supervision-labor) 
beta25 -0.058 -2.619 ln(pesticide)*ln(supervision-labor) 
beta26 0.121 2.573 ln(threshing-machinery)*ln(supervision-labor) 
beta27 -0.052 -2.239 ln(supervision-labor)*ln(nursery-labor) 
beta28 0.345 12.640 ln(supervision-labor)*ln(seeds) 
beta29 0.002 0.286 ln(supervision-labor)*ln(irrigation-hrs) 
beta30 -0.675 -15.167 ln(acreage)*ln(seeds) 
beta31 0.246 8.279 ln(harvesting-threshing-labor)*ln(seeds) 
beta32 0.049 2.564 ln(pesticide)*ln(seeds) 
beta33 0.019 0.759 ln(threshing-machinery)*ln(seeds) 
beta34 0.018 1.674 ln(seeds)*ln(DAP) 
beta35 -0.014 -2.433 ln(seeds)*ln(potash) 
sigma-squared 0.375 6.686  
gamma 0.964 145.436  
delta 1 1.194 5.538 Time 
delta 2 -0.107 -5.714 Time^2 
delta 3 0.957 6.075 Village dummy 
delta 4 0.610 5.893 Wage gap (brick kiln) 
delta 5 0.215 7.446 Owned no. of plots 
delta 6 -6.026 -4.705 Weeding vs. land preparation (fixed effects) 
delta 7 -11.423 -5.022 Transplanting vs. sowing labor (fixed effects) 
delta 8 7.327 7.033 Irrigation vs. sowing labor (fixed effects) 
delta 9 -38.529 -8.316 Sowing vs. weeding labor (fixed effects) 
delta10 -2.765 -2.209 Sowing vs. pesticide labor (fixed effects) 
delta11 37.058 6.913 Sowing vs. harvesting labor (fixed effects) 
delta12 9.675 7.154 Transplanting vs. weeding labor (fixed effects) 
delta13 -10.824 -7.749 Transplanting vs. pesticide labor (fixed effects) 
delta14 11.319 6.239 Transplanting vs. harvesting labor (fixed effects) 
delta15 10.441 5.444 Pesticide vs. harvesting labor (fixed effects) 
delta16 -0.051 -3.347 Acreage 
    log of the likelihood function:   353.087      LR test of the one-sided error: 206.722 
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Table 6.b: Stochastic Frontier Results for both villages: Samba-Cotton  
 
 Coefficient t-ratio variable 
beta 0 -15.782 -13.325 ln(output) 
beta 1 1.433 8.167 ln(acreage) 
beta 2 5.708 6.390 ln(land-preparation labor) 
beta 3 -0.351 -4.841 ln(harvesting-threshing labor) 
beta 4 -0.651 -0.869 ln(pesticide) 
beta 5 0.194 1.446 ln(cartage) 
beta 6 16.371 24.879 ln(general labor) 
beta 7 -14.209 -19.849 ln(nursery labor) 
beta 8 -0.949 -6.462 ln(bull) 
beta 9 2.773 8.272 ln(seed) 
beta10 -1.312 -17.125 ln(irrigation-hrs) 
beta11 -3.683 -5.787 ln(DAP) 
beta12 -1.382 -3.867 ln(urea) 
beta13 -0.192 -5.390 ln(potash) 
beta14 0.662 11.089 ln(acreage)^2 
beta15 -0.682 -6.631 ln(land-preparation labor)^2 
beta16 -0.019 -0.239 ln(pesticide)^2 
beta17 -0.123 -5.276 ln(machinery-day)^2 
beta18 -0.190 -4.805 ln(cartage)^2 
beta19 -1.698 -24.404 ln(general labor)^2 
beta20 0.126 9.775 ln(supervision labor)^2 
beta21 3.138 18.599 ln(nursery labor)^2 
beta22 0.168 6.375 ln(bull)^2 
beta23 -0.199 -6.784 ln(seed)^2 
beta24 0.092 7.032 ln(irrigation-hrs)^2 
beta25 0.360 5.125 ln(DAP)^2 
beta26 0.116 3.499 ln(urea)^2 
beta27 0.011 10.147 time^2 
sigma-
squared 
0.009 6.643  
gamma 1.000 5031.547  
delta 1 -0.075 -0.905 Time 
delta 2 0.021 1.759 time^2 
delta 3 0.204 2.124 Dummy 
delta 4 0.072 1.870 Wage gap (male-female) 
delta 5 0.145 2.704 wage gap (brick-kiln) 
delta 6 0.029 3.717 total no. of plots cultivated 
delta 7 -0.710 -0.718 land preparation vs. transplanting labor (fixed effects) 
delta 8 -0.694 -0.727 land preparation vs. irrigation labor (fixed effects) 
delta 9 -1.014 -1.053 Weeding vs. land preparation labor (fixed effects) 
delta10 0.161 0.173 land preparation vs. pesticide labor (fixed effects) 
delta11 -0.817 -0.884 sowing vs. pesticide labor (fixed effects) 
delta12 1.137 1.238 Transplanting vs. harvesting labor (fixed effects) 
delta13 1.268 1.082 Irrigation vs. pesticide labor (fixed effects) 
delta14 0.228 0.187 Pesticide vs. harvesting labor (fixed effects) 
delta15 -0.006 -0.906 Acreage 
 
                  log likelihood function:        133.720  
                  LR test of the one-sided error:  21.685  
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Table 7: Description of variables used in frontier 
 
7.1.a  Samba-Blackgram :Inputs 
 
S. no Variable Description Unit of measurement 
1 ln(acreage) Acreage commitment to the crop Acres 
2 ln(harvesting-threshing labor) Labor for harvesting and threshing operations Labor-days 
3 ln(threshing by machinery) Tractors used for threshing Days 
4 ln(general labor) Labor used for weeding, irrigation and application of pesticides and fertilizers Labor-days 
5 ln(nursery labor) Labor used in nursery for land preparation and seeding  Labor-days 
6 ln(bull) Bullocks used for land preparation and  threshing Number of bullocks 
7 ln(seeds) Quantity of seeds used Kilograms 
8 ln(irrigation-hrs) 
 
Irrigation of the crops 
 
Hours 
9 
  
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
ln(potash) Fertilizer
 
Kilograms 
10 ln(acreage)^2  
11 ln(land-preparation-labor)^2
 
 
12 ln(pesticide)^2  
13 ln(cartage)^2  
14 ln(general-labor)^2  
15 ln(nursery-labor)^2
 
 
16 ln(seeds)^2  
17 ln(irrigation-hrs)^2
 
 
18 ln(DAP)^2  
19 ln(urea)^2  
20 ln(potash)^2  
21 Time Year of production 
 
 
22 Ln(acreage)*ln(supervision-labor)  
23 Ln(land-preparation-labor)*ln (supervision-labor)  
24 ln(harvesting-threshing-labor)*ln(supervision-labor)
 
 
25 ln(pesticide)*ln(supervision-labor)  
26 ln(threshing-machinery)*ln(supervision-labor)
 
 
27 ln(supervision-labor)*ln(nursery-labor)
 
 
28 ln(supervision-labor)*ln(seeds)  
29 ln(supervision-labor)*ln(irrigation-hrs)
 
 
30 ln(acreage)*ln(seeds)  
31 ln(harvesting-threshing-labor)*ln(seeds)
 
 
32 ln(pesticide)*ln(seeds)  
33 ln(threshing-machinery)*ln(seeds)
 
 
34 ln(seeds)*ln(DAP)  
35 ln(seeds)*ln(potash)  
 
   
  
 
7.1.b  Samba-Blackgram: factors causing inefficiency  
 
S. no Variable Description Unit of measurement 
1 Time Year of production  
2  
  
  
time^2   
3 village dummy Dummy variable indicating membership to Nelpathur village  
4 wage gap for brick kiln Wage gap between brick kiln workers and hired labor Rupees 
5 owned no. of plots Total number of plots owned by the farmer  
6 weeding -land preparation (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of land preparation labor vs weeding labor  
7 transplanting -sowing labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of sowing labor vs transplanting labor  
8 irrigation -sowing labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of sowing labor vs irrigation labor  
9 sowing -weeding labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of sowing labor vs weeding labor  
10 sowing-pesticide labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of sowing labor vs pesticide application labor  
11 sowing -harvesting labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of sowing labor vs harvesting labor  
12 transplanting -weeding labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of transplanting labor vs weeding labor  
13 transplanting -pesticide labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of transplanting labor vs pesticide application labor  
14 transplanting –harvesting labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of transplanting labor vs harvesting labor
15 pesticide-harvesting labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of pesticide application labor vs harvesting labor
16 Acreage Acreage commitment to the crop Acre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7.2.a  Samba-Cotton :Inputs 
 
S. no Variable Description Unit of measurement 
1 Acreage Acreage commitment to the crop Acres 
2 Land-preparation labor Labor for leveling, seeding, transplanting nad land preparation Labor-days 
3 Harvesting-threshing labor Labor for harvesting and threshing operations Labor-days 
4 Pesticide Quantity of pesticides used Litres 
5 Cartage Carts used for transporting output to threshing mills or to the market Number of cart trips 
6 General labor Labor used for weeding, irrigation and application of pesticides and fertilizers Labor-days 
7 Nursery labor Labor used in nursery for land preparation and seeding  Labor-days 
8 Bull Bullocks used for land preparation and threshing Number of bullocks 
9 Seed Quantity of seeds used Kilograms 
10 Irrigation-hrs 
 
Irrigation of the crops Hours 
11   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
   
  
  
   
   
  
   
  
DAP Fertilizer-Diammonium Phosphate
 
Litres
12 Urea Fertilizer Kilograms 
13 Potash Fertilizer
 
Kilograms 
14 ln(acreage)^2  
15 ln(land-preparation labor)^2
 
 
16 ln(pesticide)^2  
17 ln(machinery-day)^2
 
 
18 ln(cartage)^2  
19 ln(general labor)^2  
20 ln(supervision labor)^2
 
 
21 ln(nursery labor)^2
 
 
22 ln(bull)^2  
23 ln(seed)^2  
24 ln(irrigation-hrs)^2
 
 
25 ln(DAP)^2  
26 ln(urea)^2
 
 
27 time^2  
 
 
 
 
  
 
7.2.b  Samba-Cotton :factors causing inefficiency  
 
S. no Variable Description Unit of measurement 
1 Time Year of production  
2  
  
  
  
  
time^2   
3 Dummy Dummy variable indicating membership to Nelpathur village  
4 wage male-female Wage gap between male and female labor Rupees 
5 wage brick-kiln Wage gap between brick kiln workers and hired labor Rupees 
6 total no. of plots Total number of plots being cultivated by a farmer  
7 land preparation-transplanting labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of land preparation labor vs transplanting labor  
8 land preparation-irrigation labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of land preparation labor vs irrigation labor
9 weeding -land preparation labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of land preparation labor vs weeding labor  
10 land preparation-pesticide labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of land preparation labor vs pesticide application labor  
11 sowing -pesticide labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of sowing labor vs pesticide application labor  
12 transplanting –harvesting labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of transplanting labor vs harvesting labor
13 irrigation -pesticide labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of irrigation labor vs pesticide application labor
14 pesticide -harvesting labor (fixed effects) Fixed effects from the comparison of pesticide application labor vs harvesting labor
15 Acreage Acreage commitment to the crop Acre 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of Nelpathur and Thirunagari villages 
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 Figure 2 : Distribution of farm size in Nelpathur and Thirunagari 
 
 
 
    
2.a    Nelpathur 
 
 
 
 
2.b   Thirunagari 
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 Figure 3 : Distribution of average plot size in Nelpathur and Thirunagari 
 
 
 
3.a        Nelpathur 
 
 
 
3.b        Thirunagari 
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 Figure 4 : Pattern of holding of plots by farmers in Nelpathur and Thirunagari8
 
4.a        Nelpathur 
 
 
 
4.b        Thirunagari 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 These figures do not include farmers owing a single plot 
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Figure 5 : Distribution of Rice Yield in Nelpathur and Thirunagari 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.a       Nelpathur : Samba (Rabi Rice) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.b        Nelpathur: Kuruvai (Kharif Rice) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.c        Thirunagari :Samba (Rabi Ric
     
 AS
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Figure 6 : Distribution of Black Gram yield in Nelpathur & Thirunagari 
 
 
 
6.a         Nelpathur : Black Gram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.b        Thirunagari :Black Gram 
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Figure 7 : Distribution of Cotton yield in Nelpathur 
 
 
 
7.a      Nelpathur :Cotton  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Relation between cost per unit output and fragmentation 
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8.a     Samba 
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8.b     Black Gram 
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8.c     Cotton 
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Figure 9: Relationship between fixed effects and J-fragmentation index (Samba) 
 
a) Tranplanting vs. Sowing Labor 
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b) Sowing vs. Weeding Labor 
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 c) Transplanting vs. Harvesting Labor 
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c) Weeding vs. Labor for Pesticide application 
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